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Second Turkish trial implicates authorities in planned attack on church leaders

WWM (04.11.2014) - In a surprise October decision, a Turkish judge has filed a criminal complaint against a police chief and an army captain, implicating them in a plot to kill a church leader in Izmit, 60 miles east of Istanbul. It's the second recent court case in Turkey to try suspects with alleged connections to higher authorities for plotting violence against Christians.

The trial against five young men who brutally murdered three Christians in 2007 at the Zirve Christian Publishing House, a crime which hit global headlines, is still continuing in the southeastern city of Malatya.

In Izmit, Turkish Protestant Pastor Emre Karaali and his lawyers believe the 13 suspects who plotted to attack him and his congregation in 2012 did not act alone, but were guided by police and military forces who conceived the plot.

In the third hearing of the case on Oct. 21, suspect Ufuk Suer, 34, said the ring-leader of the group was in contact with the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) leading up to their arrest, according to the court minutes.

Although other suspects had also testified they had links with higher authorities and MIT, Judge Yusuf Coskun seemed initially hesitant to implicate the police or army, according to Karaali. The pastor said he thought the judge's decision was a significant development in the case.

In June his lawyer had requested the court to conduct a formal investigation of the police and military authorities identified in the case file.

"The judge accepted our request and filed a criminal complaint against them," Karaali said. "We weren't expecting it. It was a surprise decision."

Police arrested 13 suspects on Jan. 16, 2013 in connection with a months-long plot to attack Karaali and his congregation.

Police claimed they arrested the suspects just before they were about to attack. The suspects had infiltrated the church feigning interest in Christianity, and police said they gleaned information by listening to their telephones.

"There is now a connection between this case and the police and military," Karaali told World Watch Monitor. But he admitted he was now "uncomfortable" that these newly named suspects were still free.

The judge has so far declined the prosecution lawyer's requests that all suspects be kept in custody. After several days of interrogation following their arrest, all but one was released. Ferhat Cakar, the alleged ring-leader, had been held in detention for six months pending the trial but due to delays, had since been out for more than a year.

Karaali said he felt tense in court for the first time before the third hearing began. The suspects appeared "cool" and "confident," he noted, as if nothing worried them.

"Our expectation is to find out who was behind these [13] people's plans," he said. "Because these people could not have done what they did without support, that's obvious. Someone used them and that's also obvious. So the question is who, and why?"

The two new suspects, police chief Hasan Erdogan and captain Levent Birsin, were ordered to appear at the next court hearing scheduled for Jan. 15.

Similarities with the Malatya trial

In both cases, Karaali explained, public opinion was primed before the planned crime through negative media propaganda, claiming Christians were posing a threat to the relevant city.

Months before the plot to attack the church in Izmit, he says Turkish journalist Banu Avar told visitors at a local book fair that "imperialist missionaries" were targeting the city to convert its population.

Similarly, a public protest was orchestrated in Malatya when Christian literature arrived at the Zirve office, where the murder later took place, prompting disinformation against Christian activities in the local news.

Just as in Izmit, the Malatya suspects also infiltrated the Christian groups. Some of the accused killers had met with their victims under the pretext of studying the Bible, to build a trust relationship with them.

Finally, the suspects had links with the police and military in both incidents. "I think the process was the same, the scenario was the same, but the results were different," Karaali said.

Karaali has declined an offer of police protection, although he moved his wife and two small children to a more secure location after the alleged plot was exposed.

The church leader came from a Muslim background to Christianity 14 years ago. Now 35, he has pastored the Izmit Protestant Church, under the legal umbrella of the Istanbul Protestant Church Foundation, since 2009.

Turkish religious order tests AKP's limits

Al Monitor (30.09.2014) http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-akp-religious-movements-power.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter# - The September issue of the conservative journal Marifet, a monthly science and culture publication by the Ismailaga religious order, published a searing cover story titled "Whose New Turkey Is It?" harshly criticizing senior members of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government.

Ismailaga is one of the most eminent religious orders in Turkey, centered at the Ismailaga mosque in the heart of Istanbul. Belonging to a larger order of Naqshbandi, a major spiritual order of Sunni Islam, which has spread from China to the Balkans, Ismailaga stands as somewhat different from other religious orders in Turkey. Members of the order abide by a certain dress code. Men sport beards and wear caftans and baggy trousers in daily life and white turbans at prayer time, while women mostly wear a black hijab with a veil. Situated in the Carsamba quarters of the Fatih district, the order has established the most visible Islamic enclave in Istanbul. From toothpaste to prayer rugs, special products designed for the preferences of observant Muslims in this neighborhood are readily available.

The order is certainly not archaic, with adherents being active on social media, and having just established a TV channel and created a mobile application of the order's Web page that can be downloaded from Google Play and the Apple Store.

Marifet's cover story was written by Muhammed Keskin, one of the order's influential leaders and a relative of Mahmud Ustaosmanoglu, the elderly sheikh of the establishment. This is the first time the order directly criticized the AKP elites in writing. It is seen as the harbinger of further discontent to be voiced from the most conservative sections in Turkey against the AKP. This calls for understanding the main argument of the piece and its immediate implications.

Keskin expressed the resentment of pious Muslims in the current establishment clearly by saying: "In our quest to get rid of the strict secular order, which does not allow a living space for Muslims, we are now concerned about the invasion of perverted foreign ideas." Keskin argues that the real Anatolian Muslims are forsaken at the expense of Wahhabi and Shiite beliefs — indicating the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran — in Turkey.

The only person whose name is spelled out in the piece is Hayrettin Karaman, the well-respected theologian and columnist for the pro-AKP daily Yeni Safak. Karaman is criticized for not providing adequate Islamic guidance to the government. The piece voices strong disapproval of a few AKP elites without naming names. Two of them are worth noting: former Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bagis, who allegedly mocked verses of the Quran on the phone with a journalist, and Efan Ala, the minister of interior who was perceived as insulting the Prophet Muhammad. While campaigning for the presidential elections in July 2014, Ala praised the AKP for its "humility" in lifting the headscarf ban and saying that even the Prophet Muhammad "showed signs of pride after his conquest of Mecca, but the AKP would not." While Turkey's top cleric Mehmet Gormez, the head of the Religious Affairs Directorate, struggled to justify Ala's comments, Cubbeli Ahmet Hoca, a well-known preacher of the Ismailaga order, spoke passionately against Ala, criticizing him of being ignorant and unworthy of his position.

Indeed, the Marifet journal's September cover story has been long in the making for the followers of Hoca, whose sermons openly lambast AKP elites who offend and contradict Islam. Most importantly, Keskin wrote that genuine Muslims were disappointed that these

men who insulted Islam were protected by those who occupy the highest seats of government.

When Al-Monitor investigated the impressions of AKP elites and pro-AKP conservative columnists in early September about Keskin's article, the common mood was that since only a few hundred people read the journal, the story was not worthy of attention. One pro-AKP journalist, who asked to remain anonymous, told Al-Monitor, "The issue of religious orders in Turkey is sensitive. It is better to let the orders resolve their own matters. This seems like an internal issue of the order."

While the pro-AKP elites downplayed the publication, the Gulen movement, which is critical of the government and has the widest media outreach of any religious order in Turkey, ensured the piece appeared among their headlines. It was subsequently shared by secular media outlets as well. Thus, Keskin's piece reached well beyond the regular conservative readership in Turkey.

So, the issue got more complicated. On Sept. 22, the pro-AKP media announced that the Ismailaga order had issued a correction asking the pro-Gulen movement paper Zaman daily to make corrections to its story. The announcement stated that the piece only reflects the author's personal views and not those of the order. On Sept. 25, Marifet lashed out against the two pro-AKP dailies, Yeni Safak and Sabah, saying the Ismailaga community stood by the piece, and that it was written with the knowledge and approval of their sheikh. Other religious and political orders, such as the nationalist religious Alperen movement, declared their support for Keskin against the pro-AKP media. Gulen followers — who used to be at odds with the Ismailaga order — cheered the open, courageous and poignant disapproval of the AKP's elites along with more secular groups on social media and in print.

While all this was happening, the top AKP officials remained silent. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, known for his outbursts against criticism, preferred not to directly engage the order, which he has had good relations with in the past. Erdogan had visited Sheikh Mahmud Efendi prior to the last election in August 2014 seeking his blessings. The imams from the order traveled to Soma to pray for the victims of the mine disaster and advise the mourners not to speak out against the AKP government. Hoca has gone on record praising and praying for the new prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. On Sept. 28, Ismailaga elders visited Erdogan and photos were immediately posted on the Ismailaga and pro-AKP media websites.

Almost all religious establishments oscillate between being valuable voter blocs for politicians and staying out of politics. It is not just the Ismailaga order; almost all religious orders have some sort of relationship with various political parties and bureaucrats. The politicization of religious orders predates the AKP. Researcher and writer Cetin Demirhan told Al-Monitor, "It is against the essence of these religious orders to get involved in politics. Yet, they are involved in daily politics. I believe it is detrimental for their spiritual well-being."

Demirhan makes a crucial point for two reasons. Traditionally, there has been a tacit competition between different religious orders, and therefore, governments could easily play one against another. The perception that religious orders should refrain from politics has also been used by pro-government media outlets to tarnish a religious order's reputation if it dare speak up against the government.

Keskin's article asking whose New Turkey it is shows the ulema of Turkey disapproving of the AKP elites' code of conduct and warns them that these types of behavior may alienate the pious, observant or Islamist voters. The AKP is facing a serious dilemma with the elections in June 2015: If these religious orders collaborate rather than compete, how can the AKP find the least common denominator to satisfy most, if not all, of them?

Looking at the latest photos of Erdogan with Ismailaga elders, it seems he knows well he cannot afford to lose the support of the order, while still battling the Gulen movement.

So far, religious orders have quietly played a rather stabilizing role for the AKP behind closed doors. It seems Erdogan and his men will pay a hefty price to sustain the stability.

Turkey must reform religious education in schools to ensure respect for parents' convictions

Registrar of the European Court (16.09.2014) – <http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/common/document.view.php?docId=6885> - In today's Chamber judgment in the case of **Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey** (application no. 21163/11), which is not final (1), the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been **a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to education)** to the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to Mansur Yalçın, Yüksel Polat and Hasan Kılıç.

In this case, the applicants, who are adherents of the Alevi faith, an unorthodox minority branch of Islam, complained that the content of the compulsory classes in religion and ethics in schools was based on the Sunni understanding of Islam.

The Court observed in particular that in the field of religious instruction, the Turkish education system was still inadequately equipped to ensure respect for parents' convictions. The violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 found by the Court on that account had arisen out of a structural problem already identified in the case of *Hasan and Eylem Zengin* (2). Turkey had to remedy the situation without delay, in particular by introducing a system whereby pupils could be exempted from religion and ethics classes without their parents having to disclose their own religious or philosophical convictions.

Principal facts

The applicants are 14 Turkish nationals: Mr Mansur Yalçın, Mr Namık Sofuoğlu, Ms Serap Topçu, Mr Ali Yüce, Mr Ali Kaplan, Ms Eylem Onat Karataş, Mr Hüseyin Kaya, Ms Sevinç Ilgın, Mr İsmail Ilgın, Mr Cafer Aktan, Mr Hakkı Saygı, Mr Kemal Kuzucu, Mr Yüksel Polat and Mr Hasan Kılıç. Yüksel Polat, Hasan Kılıç and Mansur Yalçın were parents of secondary-school children at the relevant time.

Mr Sofuoğlu stated that by the date on which the domestic proceedings were instituted, his son and daughter had completed the second cycle of secondary education and were in higher education. Serap Topçu and Eylem Onat Karataş stated that they had attended "compulsory religion and ethics classes" at school and that their young children – whose age they did not specify – would likewise have to attend these classes when they went to school.

On 22 June 2005 the applicants asked the Ministry of Education to initiate a consultation process with leading members of the Alevi community with a view to overhauling the curriculum of the religion and ethics classes to include Alevi culture and philosophy. After being notified of the decision to reject their proposal in a letter from the Directorate of Religious Education attached to the Ministry of Education, the applicants and 1,905 other people challenged that decision in the Ankara Administrative Court.

An expert report by a professor of Islamic studies and lecturers in education and religious sociology on the textbooks used in religion and ethics classes was included in the case file. It stated, among other things, that the curriculum did not give precedence to any particular faith and adopted a supra-denominational approach. The applicants filed additional observations challenging the report. They argued in particular that the

textbooks treated the Alevi faith as a tradition or culture and not as a belief system in its own right.

In a judgment of 1 October 2009 the Ankara Administrative Court found against the applicants, relying on the expert report. Their subsequent appeal on points of law was dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment served on 2 August 2010, which held that the judgment at first instance was in conformity with the relevant procedure and laws.

Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court

Relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to education), the applicants complained that the content of the compulsory classes in religion and ethics in schools was based on the Sunni understanding of Islam. Mansur Yalçın, Yüksel Polat and Hasan Kılıç also relied in this connection on Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion), in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination).

The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 2 February 2011.

Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:

Guido **Raimondi** (Italy), *President*,
İşıl **Karakaş** (Turkey),
András **Sajó** (Hungary),
Nebojša **Vučinić** (Montenegro),
Egidijus **Kūris** (Lithuania),
Robert **Spano** (Iceland),
Jon Fridrik **Kjølbro** (Denmark),
and also Stanley **Naismith**, *Section Registrar*.

Decision of the Court

Admissibility

Mansur Yalçın, Yüksel Polat and Hasan Kılıç, whose children were at secondary school at the relevant time, could claim to be the direct "victims" of a violation of their rights under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention.

As to the other applicants – Namık Sofuoğlu, Serap Topçu, Ali Yüce, Ali Kaplan, Eylem Onat Karataş, Hüseyin Kaya, Sevinç Ilgın, İsmail Ilgın, Cafer Aktan, Hakkı Saygı and Kemal Kuzucu – the Court noted that they were essentially complaining, under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, that the curriculum of the compulsory religion and ethics classes conflicted with their religious beliefs. It noted that they had not argued that the religious instruction received had had any specific effect on them, but had simply complained in the abstract about the impact of the curriculum on their religious beliefs, without explaining how they had been personally affected. Moreover, the mere prospect that Serap Topçu's and Eylem Onat Karataş's young children might one day have to attend the classes in question was not a sufficient basis for alleging a violation of the Convention, particularly as these applicants would still be able to lodge a fresh application in relation to this issue once their children were actually attending the classes.

Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

The Court examined the case in the light of the curriculum of the compulsory religion and ethics classes taught at the relevant time but also took into account the significant changes that had since been made to the curriculum, particularly in the wake of the

Hasan and Eylem Zengin judgment. In that connection it observed that these changes had mainly involved the inclusion of information about the various beliefs existing in Turkey, including the Alevi faith, but added that the main aspects of the curriculum had not really been overhauled since it predominantly focused on knowledge of Islam as practised and interpreted by the majority of the Turkish population. Although it was not for the Court to take a stance on a question relating to Islamic theory, it nevertheless emphasised the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality in regulating matters of religion.

The fact that the curriculum of the religion and ethics classes gave greater prominence to Islam as practised and interpreted by the majority of the Turkish population than to other minority interpretations of Islam could not in itself be viewed as a departure from the principles of pluralism and objectivity which would amount to indoctrination. However, bearing in mind the particular features of the Alevi faith as compared with the Sunni understanding of Islam³, the applicants could legitimately have considered that the approach adopted in the classes was likely to cause their children to face a conflict of allegiance between the school and their own values.

The Court failed to see how such a conflict could be avoided in the absence of an appropriate exemption procedure. The discrepancies complained of by the applicants between the approach adopted in the curriculum and the particular features of their faith as compared with the Sunni understanding of Islam were so great that they would scarcely be alleviated by the mere inclusion in textbooks of information about Alevi beliefs and practice.

In addition, the fact that the Turkish system offered only Christian and Jewish pupils the possibility of being exempted from religion and ethics classes necessarily suggested that the teaching provided in this subject was likely to cause such pupils to face conflicts between the religious instruction given by the school and their parents' religious or philosophical convictions. The Court noted in this connection that almost all of the member States offered at least one route by which pupils could opt out of religious education classes, by providing for an exemption system or the option of studying an alternative subject, or by making attendance at religious studies classes entirely optional.

The Court concluded that the Turkish education system was still inadequately equipped to ensure respect for parents' convictions, and that there had therefore been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 with regard to Mansur Yalçın, Yüksel Polat and Hasan Kılıç.

Other articles

Having regard to its finding of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, the Court considered that it was not necessary to examine the applicants' complaints under Articles 9 and 14.

Articles 46 (binding force and execution of judgments)

Since the violation it had found had arisen out of a structural problem, as in the case of *Hasan and Eylem Zengin* (3), the Court held that Turkey was to implement appropriate measures to remedy the situation without delay, in particular by introducing a system whereby pupils could be exempted.

(1) Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month period following its delivery, any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges considers whether the case deserves further examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final

judgment. If the referral request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.

Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for

(2) *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey*, no. 1448/04, judgment of 9 October 2007.

(3) *Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey* judgment, cited above, § 8 ("Alevism originated in central Asia but

developed largely in Turkey. Two important Sufis had a considerable impact on the emergence of this religious

movement: Hoca Ahmet Yesevi (12th century) and Hacı Bektaşî Veli (14th century). This belief system, which

has deep roots in Turkish society and history, is generally considered as one of the branches of Islam,

influenced in particular by Sufism and by certain pre-Islamic beliefs. Its religious practices differ from those of

the Sunni schools of law in certain aspects such as prayer, fasting and pilgrimage") and § 66.

Turkey has to protect Iraqi and Syrian Turkmen

Daily Sabah (12.07.2014) - As the Iraqi situation takes a turn for the worse, the plight of the Turkmen of Iraq, whether they are Shiite or Sunni, is surpassing crisis dimensions and needs the urgent attention of Turkey.

This is a complicated situation. The Turkmen are scattered throughout the central and northern sectors of Iraq mostly around the Kirkuk and Mosul areas. They are now running away from the malice created by religious extremists called the Islamic State for Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), and there are reports that the number of Turkmen refugees has reached the 350,000s.

What is sad is that while Shiite Arab refugees, Sunni Arab refugees and Kurds can find safe heaven for themselves, the Turkmen of Iraq, be it Shiite or Sunni, are left on their own to face an uncertain future. Ankara has been using its good offices in Iraq to provide some relief for the Turkmen, but it is seriously insufficient.

Meanwhile, the process of the disintegration of Iraq is progressing. The rift between the Kurds and Baghdad is deepening. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has accused the Kurds of cooperating with the Sunni extremists and has gone as far as to say Masoud Barzani has given facilities to ISIS in Irbil. Maliki has said his forces will take back Kirkuk and the other disputed areas taken over by the Kurds after Iraqi army units fled these locations in view of ISIS attacks. Barzani has replied that they will never give up the disputed lands. There is talk that the Kurds are pulling their people out of Baghdad, including their ministers in the central government and their parliamentarians. The Kurds have also said they will take legal action against oil companies that are buying Iraqi oil, as the central government does not pay them the share of oil revenues that is earmarked in the Iraqi budget.

Meanwhile, the ISIS forces are continuing to make gains against Maliki's forces, while the political situation in Baghdad deteriorates with the parliament paralyzed after failure to convene repeated times. There are also divisions in the Shiite bloc as there are growing calls for a new government without Maliki. But time is running out for Iraq as fighting continues and a kind of meaningful resolution of the crisis seems distant.

Everything points to a gradual disintegration of Iraq. So amid this tragic picture there are urgent decisions to be made and steps to be taken by Ankara.

First, we have to decide what our position will be to the Kurds declaring an independent state in Irbil. Will we accept the Kurdish declaration and demand clarifications on the status of Kirkuk? What will be our conditions to accept Kurdish independence?

Secondly, we have to create and secure a safe haven even today for the Turkmen in Iraqi territory by putting pressure on the Kurds and the Arab Sunnis. We have the oil card as a strong leverage and our close ties with Barzani to make this work. Then of course we have to convince the Turkmen to move to this safe haven and create their own autonomous zone or maybe even a Turkmen state in Iraq. It is crucial that Ankara steps in and acts quickly.

Thirdly, we have to pay attention to the plight of the Turkmen in Syria and see that their interests are also served. It is true that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is now busy with his presidential campaign, but he has to take time off for the Turkmen of Iraq. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is a man of strategy, should be able to contribute in this mission along with National Intelligence Organization (MİT) Chief Hakan Fidan.

European Court fines Turkey for Jehovah's Witnesses forced to do military service

Hurriyet Daily News (04.06.2014) - The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has fined Turkey 57,650 euros for prosecuting and convicting four Jehovah's Witnesses who refused compulsory military service, according to a statement from the Court on June 3.

Çağlar Buldu, Barış Görmez, Ersin Ölgün and Nevzat Umdü also complained about the treatment they sustained during the proceedings in question.

The applicants argued that their criminal convictions entailed a violation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Görmez also complained that he had had to appear, as a civilian, before a court made up exclusively of military personnel.

The ECHR ordered Turkey to pay Buldu 12,000 euros, Görmez 15,000 euros, Ölgün 7,000 euros and Umdü 5,000 euros for non-pecuniary damage, in addition to a sum of 18,650 for costs and expenses.

In a separate case, six relatives of a conscript, Ferit Aktepe, who committed suicide during service, also applied to the ECHR, saying he showed signs of anxiety and was taking drugs at the time.

Aktepe was found fit for service by doctors and had not informed the authorities of any particular problems, but his weapon was taken from him as a safety measure.

On March 1, 2005 he was found to have been lethally wounded by a weapon belonging to one of the other conscripts.

The military authorities should have taken appropriate measures in order to protect him from physical and mental injury, his relatives said, also complaining that the related investigation was insufficient.

The ECHR ruled that 1,365 euros of just satisfaction to the six applicants jointly for pecuniary damage, 9,000 euros to Aktepe's father and mother jointly, 6,500 euros to his two brothers jointly and 4,500 euros to his grandfather and grandmother jointly for non-pecuniary damage, in addition to 12,000 euros in sum for costs and expenses.

See full judgment in French at

<http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/common/document.view.php?docId=6249>

Church website blocked as 'porn' by Turkish parliament

Lawmaker calls it 'embarrassing, humiliating and defaming'

By Damaris Kremida

World Watch Monitor (31.05.2014) - Aykan Erdemir, a member of Turkey's parliament, plans to travel to Diyarbakir Church in mid-June. This week, to prepare for his visit, he looked up the church's website.

He didn't get far. His office computer in the parliament blocked the church website with a message that it contained "pornographic" content.

Checking the websites of other Turkish Protestant churches, Erdemir and his colleagues found they also were blocked, though the filtering screens did not mention "pornography" as the reason.

The website for Diyarbakir Church, in southeastern Turkey, is not under a national ban, although on occasion, websites are banned in Turkey — the most notable in recent months being YouTube.

The block affected computers in the parliament only, and it was quickly removed after Erdemir complained.

"The lifting of the block on the Diyarbakir Church website was a small step for internet freedoms in Turkey, but a big step for internet freedom in the Parliament," he said.

Erdemir, representing the western province of Bursa in the main opposition Republican People's Party, said the episode is a symptom of deep-rooted governmental antagonism toward Christians, especially Protestants, and of Turkey's increasing intolerance towards minorities.

"Humiliating, embarrassing and defaming" is how he described the block on the website.

The newspaper Daily Hurriyet reported Thursday that the filter killed two birds with one stone: It aimed to prejudice Parliamentarians, and to attack minority groups.

"They are just trying to support their own party's politics and agendas with inflammatory and marginalizing language," said Ahmet Guvener, pastor of the Diyarbakir Church. "This is embarrassing and outrageous and they should apologize for this."

Guvener, a convert from Islam, said he does not feel he has equal rights with other Turks. He said his country regards him as a threat. His phone, he said, has been tapped since 2007, when three Christians were tortured and murdered in the city of Malatya.

"They have been listening to my phone without a break since Malatya," Guvener said. He claims to have seen his name on wiretap lists, and said police continue to question him about subjects he has discussed on the phone with other Christian believers.

He said he believes law enforcement authorities consider Christianity to be one of the country's greatest threats, and that military training has reinforced an attitude of marginalization.

"They really don't see Turkish Christians as citizens of this country," he said. "Turkey knowingly intimidates Christians here, so in my opinion the block on our website was done knowingly."

Guvener's lawyer has petitioned the deputy secretary general of the Turkish Parliament, Kemal Kaya, to explain why the church website was blocked. Guvener said legal action against the Parliament remains a possibility.

Erdemir, an advocate of religious and minority rights in Turkey and author of Turkey's Hate Crimes Bill, said changing the Parliament's internet settings by itself won't end anti-Christian behavior.

"The only way to remedy it is to embrace tolerant values," he said.

The MP said official discrimination is felt more keenly among Turkey's Protestants than among more established churches, and that a "paranoia" pervades the country about missionary activities, in particular conversions from Islam to Christianity.

"But it's not an issue that can be solved at the legal level," he said. "It necessitates transforming mentalities, sensitivities and attitudes" among the country's bureaucrats, lawmakers and journalists.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkey's ruling AK Party have come under fire in the last year from protests against the decline of Turkey's secularism and allegations of corruption. Erdemir has had his own difficulties getting the Parliament, controlled by the AK Party, to take up his hate-crime bill.

"The Prime Minister's policies actually profit from polarization, discrimination and hate speech," Erdemir said. "So I don't have any expectations from the government when it comes to establishing a multicultural pluralist and tolerant society."

Deutsche Welle reports on 'Christians in Turkey are second-class citizens'

By Walter Flick

Order of St. Andrew the Apostle (09.05.2014) - Turkey's small Christian population doesn't enjoy all the same rights as the Muslim majority. The Greek Orthodox Church has a particularly difficult relationship with the state, says religion expert Walter Flick.

The spiritual leader of the world's Orthodox Christians, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, arrives to Germany May 10. During his nine-day visit, the 74-year-old will meet with state representatives including Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Joachim Gauck. He'll also be a guest of honor at major Christian churches, and receive an honorary doctorate from the University of Munich.

Bartholomew I has been the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, based in Istanbul, since November 1991. Orthodox Christians are a tiny minority in Turkey, and the population routinely faces discrimination. Walter Flick, a religious expert with the

International Society for Human Rights in Germany, shares his insights on the situation in an interview with DW.

DW: Are Christians oppressed in Turkey?

Walter Flick: Turkey has almost 80 million inhabitants. There are only around 120,000 Christians, which is less than 1 percent of the population. Christians are certainly seen as second-class citizens. A real citizen is Muslim, and those who aren't Muslim are seen as suspicious. Christians aren't equal. You can't say they're being persecuted in Turkey, but they don't have the same rights, especially when it comes to religious freedom.

Is the position of Greek Orthodox Christians in Turkey even more difficult?

Yes, there are difficulties. When the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923 - after the World War I and the Greco-Turkish War - Greek Orthodox Christians were given a special status allowing them to set up their own schools and institutions. But they don't have full rights. There are Greek Orthodox schools and newspapers in Istanbul, and there's a patriarchate. But the Halki seminary for Greek Orthodox theological education was closed in 1971 - and despite certain promises, it hasn't been reopened.

How can the patriarch fulfill his duties if the Turkish government doesn't like even his title?

He is the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, representing 300 million Orthodox Christians. But he's not been able to wield this title as he should - and this is a historic title that's been around since the 6th century! He isn't referred to as "Ecumenical Patriarch" within Turkey. The name is accepted overseas, but in Turkey he can't use that title, which was afforded by the European Convention on Human Rights.

The state has started confiscating real estate belonging to Greek Orthodox Christians. Many properties have been lost over the past few decades, for example office buildings, orphanages and other institutions. Of course that's touched a nerve with the church - the dwindling Greek Orthodox population in Turkey, about 5,000 people, depend on income from properties. If church members bequeath property, the church isn't able to easily receive it. In 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan promised return of expropriated real estate. Although that's been partly carried out, not all of it has been returned.

Bartholomew is regarded as a man of binding words and an outstretched hand. Does he have hope for fixing the problems his religious community is experiencing in Turkey?

I hope so. The opening of the Halki seminary is something that was promised decades ago. Then there have been law reforms announced, that for example private school law would be changed. But no dates have been given. Perhaps they will return everything next year, on the anniversary of the pogrom against Greeks in Turkey, in September 1955.

If the pan-Orthodox council takes place in Istanbul in 2016, that could be a historic event. What gestures might you expect to see from the Turkish government?

Of course the Halki seminary should be opened. And then the rest of the outstanding property should be returned to the Greek Orthodox Church. It would also be important for the churches to be given legal personhood in Turkey - something the patriarch has

been demanding for some time. Then it would be possible for them to acquire property and register land. This would create a sense of security, and should definitely happen.

Vandalism at a sacred site in Constantinople

Reportage by Nicholas Manginas

Order of St. Andrew the Apostole (26.03.2014) - On Sunday, March 23, 2014 at noon, a number of young vandals invaded the courtyard and the chapel of Agia Paraskevi, the site of a Sacred Spring (Agiasma), outside the Byzantine walls near the Monastery of Baloukli.

For at least five hours, according to the testimony of the church sacristan (neokoros) of forty years, Athanasiou Ozkaramichaloglou, the runaway crowd of youths looted and dishonored the sacred precincts of the Agiasma, disrupting the entire sanctuary, sending sacred vessels and priestly vestments flying to the floor. They also invaded the home of the neokoros. They caused significant damage, broke into the candle pangari, and when they fled, even stole a bell!

These unfortunate events occurred during the celebrations of the Turkish holiday, Nevrouz, that is a Springtime festival originating in Mesopotamia and continuing today in Turkey especially among Kurds. It is worth noting that despite calls for help (that were unanswered) the neokoros and his family fled from the area, resorting to the protection of the local police station only forty meters away. Even then the police declined to intervene on the pretext of further exacerbating the crowd. The band of youths left in the wreckage two flags of the HDP Party (composed mainly of Kurds).

Upon being informed of the events, His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew expressed sorrow and indignation for the vandalism at the Agiasma.

Turkey refuses to conform to European standards in the matter of conscientious objection

Jehovah's Witnesses (17.03.2014) / <http://www.jw.org/en/news/legal/by-region/turkey/human-rights-violations-persist-conscientious-objection/> - "Every Turk is born a soldier." That saying is taught to schoolchildren, declared in political speeches, and drilled into men called up for military service. Military service is mandatory for all male Turkish citizens and induction is a cause for celebration. It may come as no surprise, then, that the government of Turkey refuses to recognize the fundamental right of conscientious objection to military service.

Yet, as a member State of the Council of Europe, and having adopted the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its national law, Turkey has committed itself to abide by European standards. Since the decision by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in *Bayatyan v. Armenia*, Turkey has a formal obligation to the Council of Europe to recognize the right to conscientious objection. Because it has refused to do so, conscientious objectors in Turkey suffer the consequences.

Over the past 10 years, 55 men who are Jehovah's Witnesses have petitioned the Turkish government to recognize their right to conscientious objection. Because their petitions have been denied, they have faced numerous prosecutions, burdensome fines, and in the case of some, years in prison. Currently, 15 young Witness men in Turkey are facing repeated prosecution for their refusal to serve in the military.

'I must follow the dictates of my conscience'

"I do not believe that a powerful State should be able to force me to act against my Bible-trained conscience and the God-inspired words of Isaiah 2:4, [which] I believe I must obey." That well-known verse, inscribed in stone in front of the headquarters of the United Nations in New York City, states that people opposed to war would 'beat swords into plowshares and not learn war anymore.' With these words Feti Demirtaş, a citizen of Turkey then 25 years old, explained why he was willing to give up his freedom and go to prison rather than serve in the military. As one of Jehovah's Witnesses, Feti believes strongly in following the dictates of his Bible-trained conscience. For that reason, Feti has been prosecuted ten times and has served in prison for more than a year and a half.

When first arrested, a sergeant ordered him to put on a military uniform but Feti refused—he chose to obey his Bible-trained conscience. The base commander then had him brought in front of 400 men and ordered Feti to put on the military uniform. Again he refused. During this first imprisonment, he was verbally abused, kicked in the head, shoulders, and legs, and slapped in the face by prison guards.

Upon his fifth arrest and imprisonment in April 2006, guards forced Feti to strip to his underwear so that he might put on the uniform. When he would not put on the uniform, guards put him in the disciplinary barracks for four days. In an effort to break his will, they handcuffed him to an iron bar of his bed at night and to prison bars during the day. Feti said, "I was fearful during the day and could not sleep at night due to my real and ever present fear of the type of mistreatment I might experience next. Although I was emotionally drained due to my treatment, I remained determined to live by my conscience."

The European Court of Human Rights weighs in on conscientious objection

In 2007 Feti Demirtaş submitted his case to the ECHR, arguing that the Turkish government violated his rights when sentencing him to prison as a conscientious objector. On January 17, 2012, the ECHR issued a judgment in his favor, confirming that Feti had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, causing severe pain and suffering. Further, the Court confirmed that the right of conscientious objection based on deeply held religious beliefs is a right protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. *

Following the Court's clear expression on the issue of conscientious objection, Feti expected that Turkish authorities would put an end to the ongoing prosecutions against him. In fact, the Turkish government paid him 20,000 euros in damages, costs, and expenses as ordered by the ECHR. However, just four months after the ECHR judgment in *Feti Demirtaş v. Turkey*, Turkey's Military Court again sentenced him to prison for two and a half months for refusing military service. Feti filed an appeal that is currently pending with the Military Court.

The UN Human Rights Committee also supports the right to conscientious objection

Turkey has also disregarded recent directives from the UN Human Rights Committee. In 2008 two Witnesses, Cenk Atasoy and Arda Sarkut, filed complaints with that UN body,

alleging that Turkish authorities violated their rights by subjecting them to repeated prosecution for their refusal to perform military service. In its Views adopted on March 29, 2012, the UN Human Rights Committee stated that the men's "refusal to be drafted for compulsory military service derives from their religious beliefs" and their "subsequent prosecution and sentences amount to an infringement of their freedom of conscience, in breach of article 18, paragraph 1, of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]."

How have Turkish authorities responded to these clear directives? They still expect these two conscientious objectors to report for military call-up every four months ** or face prosecution and burdensome fines.

Jehovah's Witnesses in Turkey are determined to live by the Biblical command to love their fellowman. At the time of call-up for military service by Turkish authorities, each individual Witness must personally decide how he will respond. Feti Demirtaş and other Witnesses have determined for themselves that bearing arms is a violation of the Bible's command and their conscience.

These young men look to their government to honor its legal commitments. The ECHR and the UN Human Rights Committee expect that Turkey will comply with the judgments and findings of their bodies, leading the authorities in Turkey to recognize the right of conscientious objection to military service. Until it does so, Turkey stands outside the Council of Europe in honoring this fundamental human right.

Footnotes:

* This was not the first ruling by the ECHR against Turkey on the issue of conscientious objection. In November 2011 the Court rendered a judgment in favor of another Turkish Witness, Yumuns Ercep, who had been indicted 41 times over a period of 14 years for his refusal to serve in Turkey's military.

** The government recently adjusted military call-ups to every three months.

Turkey returns less than half of monastery land it seized

1,600-year-old Mor Gabriel is holy to Aramean Syriacs

By Damaris Kremida

World Watch Monitor (13.03.2014) - The Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs welcomed March 2 the return of property, seized by the country's treasury, to the world's oldest Syriac Orthodox monastery, Mor Gabriel.

In February, the head of the Mor Gabriel Religious Foundation, Kuryakos Ergun, received the property deeds to 12 plots of land totaling 244,000 square meters, or 60 acres.

The returned property is less than half of the land the monastery has owned since 1935. The monastery, in the southeastern province of Mardin, was built in 397 and is considered a holy place to Aramean Syriacs in Turkey and the diaspora.

The property first was contested in 2008 when the Forestry Ministry, the Land Registry Cadaster Office and three surrounding villages sued the monastery for allegedly "occupying" their land, according to the Hurriyet Daily News.

The heated legal battles ended in June 2012 when the Turkish supreme court of appeals upheld a decision to give substantial parts of the monastery to the Turkish Treasury and the Ministry of Forestry.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan announced in September of last year that the government would return the land to its historic owner as part of the government's "democratization package", according to the statement issued by the Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs. The decision was approved by the state agency for foundations.

However, the government did not return the remaining 18 plots of land measuring 320,000 square meters, or 79 acres. Nearly 270,000 square meters, or about 67 acres, out of the property in dispute are now in the hands of the Forestry Ministry. The rest remains seized by the Turkish treasury.

Isa Dogdu, Deputy Head of the Mor Gabriel Religious foundation, told World Watch Monitor that the monastery leadership will rest when the government returns all of the land, despite the prime minister's declaration that all the land would be returned, though he said it will be a continued battle to convince the government to do so.

"We're happy to receive it back, but we will be much happier to restore the rest of the property which belongs to the monastery," Dogdu said. "What was given is less than half of the property in question. The other parcels that are under the forestry are still pending."

Two years ago, the monastery's foundation took its case to the European Court of Human Rights, in Strassburg, France, which attracted international attention and became a topic in Turkey's bid to join the European Union. In the European Commission's 2013 Turkey Progress report, it noted that the government's abeyance on the issue was a cause for concern and called on Turkey to "ensure full respect for all property rights, including those of non-Muslim religious communities."

"The recent step taken is a significant progress in terms of promoting brotherhood in our country and consolidating democracy," read the statement, released by Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs. "We hope that this step will have positive impact on the EU accession process as well."

The ministry statement also said it does not regard the move as a favor, but a deserved right, that indicated the government's sensitivity towards human and minority rights reforms.

The monastery's property was seized under the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP.

AKP member Süleyman Çelebi said Syrian Orthodox Christians had never come under pressure, despite their claim that they were exploited, and even emigrated away from Turkey "with joy" in previous decades.

Poverty, and violence between ethnic Turks and Kurds, have caused many of the Syrians to leave Turabdin, where the monastery is located. There are now 2,500 Syrians in Turabdin, compared to about 50,000 in 1950, according to Reuters.

The sectarian violence in neighboring Syria has led some of Syria's Orthodox Syrians to flee to Turkey and many of them have found temporary refuge in Turabdin, where they can practice their religion.

ICOMOS Turkey - Briefing on the Hagia Sophia Museum

Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle (14.02.2014) - ICOMOS Turkey, the International Council of Monuments and Sites, National Committee of Turkey, recently issued a report (below) regarding two issues of concern have recently emerged regarding Hagia Sophia Museum, the first of those being the plans for the reconstruction of the now extinct building of Hagia Sophia Madrasa, and the second, the public debate surrounding the refunctioning of Hagia Sophia Museum.

Hagia Sophia Museum, one of the most remarkable monuments of the world, was inscribed on the Heritage List in 1985 as part of the Historic Areas of Istanbul; the inscription brought with it a commitment on the part of the Turkish state to protect and use the monument in accordance with the principles of the World Heritage Convention and related international documents.

Two issues of concern have recently emerged regarding Hagia Sophia Museum, the first of those being the plans for the reconstruction of the now extinct building of Hagia Sophia Madrasa, which we have already announced in our letter dated 12.06.2013, and the second, the public debate surrounding the refunctioning of Hagia Sophia Museum. This letter focuses on the former; however, for the latter, what should briefly be underlined is this: Any decision for the change of use, planning and conservation interventions on each and every World Heritage Site must be made with consideration of the situation, attributes and uses of the site/ structure at the time of its inscription on the World Heritage List, with a holistic approach and thorough consultation with the UNESCO World Heritage Centre and the international and national committees of its advisory body ICOMOS. An approach to the contrary will call into question the World Heritage status of the site.

In 1993, the State of Conservation of Hagia Sophia Museum was reviewed with a monitoring mission undertaken by UNESCO experts. As a result of a concerned criticism within the mission's report, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism decided to create a 'Scientific Committee' for the Hagia Sophia; the Committee was established with the participation of specialists in architectural history, structural and seismic engineering and conservation from Bogazici and Istanbul Technical Universities and of three officials responsible for the Museum's management and maintenance, as well as international experts. As its first task, the Scientific Committee set out the priorities of works that needed to be done; it made efforts to instill the practice of commencing conservation interventions on the site only after a specific project was designed for them and approved by the Conservation Board for Cultural and Natural Assets of the Ministry.

During the UNESCO mission of 1993, Professor Cyril Mango, one of the experts appointed on the mission, drew attention to the archaeological potential of the area to the northwest of the Hagia Sophia, where the remains of the madrasa were found, and proposed that archaeological investigations be conducted in the area. This proposal has to this day not been addressed; on the contrary, further initiatives have been developed in recent years toward the reconstruction of the demolished madrasa. In 2009, the madrasa, which had been demolished in the 1940s, was registered as a 1st grade historic monument by the IVth Conservation Board for Cultural and Natural Assets of Istanbul; accordingly, documentation, restitution and restoration proposal drawings were prepared

for the area. On April 4, 2011, the reconstruction project submitted to the Board was referred to the Hagia Sophia Scientific Committee, requesting their comments.

The erection of a new structure next to a monument of World Heritage Site status warrants close scrutiny, even if this is the reconstruction of a historic structure that was previously demolished.

The Hagia Sophia and Suleymaniye Mosque have provided the essence -the fundamental values- of the World Heritage designation of the Historic Areas of Istanbul, as per Criteria 1 and 2, and for their serving as a reference for the architectural development that followed afterwards, as per Criteria 3 and 4. It should be emphasized at this point, that the use and the environmental context of both monuments (Suleymaniye Mosque and Hagia Sophia Museum) in 1985 have played an important role in meeting the Criteria of World Heritage listing.

Considering the present state of the traditional residential quarters of Suleymaniye and Zeyrek and the way that the Land Walls have been engulfed by urban development, it can be said that Sultanahmet Archaeological Park has preserved its integrity and continuity relatively intact and that the historical stratigraphy is still legible. However, reconstruction and refunctioning interventions such as described above will clearly cause the loss of this authenticity and integrity.

The risks that would arise from the reconstruction of the madrasa, which is so close/adjacent to the Hagia Sophia, were communicated by the members of the Scientific Committee to the Minister of Culture and Tourism in 2011, and Minister Ertugrul Gunay accordingly instructed the General Director of Cultural Heritage and Museums Orhan Duzgun to have the project withdrawn.

However, in the period that followed, not only did the issue of reconstruction of the madrasa not disappear from the agenda but the Ministry of Culture and Tourism also abolished the Scientific Committee in September 2012. Afterwards, the project that the Istanbul Directorate of Surveying and Monuments had had prepared was re-submitted to the IVth Conservation Board of Istanbul, which approved the project unanimously on December 19, 2012.

The approval of the reconstruction proposal for the two-storey madrasa building, leaning against the western facade of the Hagia Sophia, reveals only the lack of professional knowledge of the Conservation Board members regarding the World Heritage legislation. If one is to consider how many 1500-year-old buildings are still standing in the world today, as well as how, among these, the Hagia Sophia may be one of a handful of outstanding accomplishments of architectural history, the implications of constructing a new 'fake historic monument' immediately next to it shows the gravity of the situation.

The proliferation of imitations and reconstructions that are far from being authentic within a cultural heritage district as deeply layered and expansive as Istanbul's World Heritage areas, would be a factor that undermines the integrity of the site in general and the significance of the authentic structures within it. Replicas of buildings, reconstructed with no good reason, and the superficiality of which even the layman can detect, should have no place within a World Heritage Site.

We hereby express our view that insisting on the execution of the reconstruction project, most recently with the concrete steps taken to this end immediately following the Conservation Board approval, will have a negative impact on the Outstanding Universal Value of Istanbul and the Hagia Sophia, and create a serious risk for the Historic Areas of Istanbul World Heritage Site.

Executive Committee of ICOMOS TURKEY

Toward an Islamic enlightenment

By Sahin Alpay

Today's Zaman (10.02.2014) - Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen, who has put forward an interpretation of Islam that advocates peace, democracy, secularism (in the sense of freedom of religion and conscience for all), science, education and a market economy, and who has supported interfaith dialogue and mutual understanding and respect for people of different ethnic and religious identities and lifestyles, has been the topic of much curiosity for native as well as foreign observers of Turkey.

The social movement he has inspired, which sponsors educational, media and business enterprises and which has built schools and universities in Turkey and in more than 120 countries has equally been a topic of curiosity.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the post-Islamist Justice and Development Party that has been in power in Turkey since 2002, and who -- until very recently -- spoke with great respect and admiration for Gülen and his movement, has begun to call Gülen a "false prophet," "fake saint" and a "bogus scholar," and the Gülen movement "a parallel state," "a gang," "an illegal organization" and "raving Hashashins." He has accused the prosecutors and police who started the corruption investigation against bureaucrats, members of his government and businessmen close to him of having taken orders from Gülen. Interest in Gülen and his movement may be said to have grown exponentially.

Friends and colleagues abroad are often asking me what to read on Gülen and his movement -- besides of course the columns I have written so far. Among the studies that have proliferated on the subject, I find the most notable to be those by M. Hakan Yavuz, a Turkish professor of political science at the University of Utah in the United States. He surely is the academic who has devoted most time and energy into research on this subject, and published extensively on it. The critical views he has sometimes directed toward the Gülen movement perhaps add to the credibility of his approach.

Yavuz's most recent book, "Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement" (Oxford University Press, 2013), is a book I find exceptionally worth reading since it provides a meticulous and comprehensive study on the background and evolution of Gülen's ideas and the structure of the movement he has inspired. It is surely far from being the final word and is open to critical evaluation on many counts, but according to my understanding, it is the best study so far on the subject.

Its main argument, as indicated in the title and expounded on in the introductory section, is the following: There is no one, single Islam. The history of Islam, like other religions, is a history of different interpretations. Modernization and globalization processes have led mainly to two opposing interpretations. Fundamentalists reject modernization and insist on a "pure" kind of Islam based on the Quran and the sayings and practices of the Prophet. Modernists, on the other hand, have sought to free Islamic thought and practice from rigid and puritanical interpretation to meet the spiritual and temporal needs of Muslims in the contemporary world. Gülen, along with Fazlur Rahman, Alija Izetbegovic, Abdurrahman Wahid, Abdolkarim Soroush and Rachid al-Ghannouchi, belong to the latter school of thought. Enlightenment does not mean the rejection of religion; it essentially means using critical reasoning to understand society and the universe. Said Nursi (1878-1960) and Gülen are representatives of "Islamic enlightenment" who have interpreted Islam in light of reason and science to bring about reforms for the building of a more humane society.

A question posed often in Turkey and abroad about the Gülen movement is on its ultimate goal. This is Yavuz's response: "This work has indicated that the movement is motivated neither by the desire to establish societal hegemony nor seize control of the Turkish state. Rather, it seeks to shape society and politics by developing and strengthening a sense of morality and virtue among believers and between communities, the state and humanity as a whole." (p. 221)

The chapter in the book which discusses the criticisms raised against the Gülen movement by assertive secularists, Islamic fundamentalists, Kurdish nationalists and part of the Alevi religious minority render the book even more relevant.
